RECENT CASES
Corporations-Amendment of Charter-Right of Minority Stockholder to Object
to Changes in Charter-[Michigan].-The defendant corporation was incorporated
under the laws of Michigan. The Michigan constitution provides that all corporation
laws, and rights, privileges, and franchises conferred thereby, are subject to amendment. Mich. Const. art. 12, § I (iqo8); Mich. Comp. L. 1929, § 237. Subsequent to
the creation of the defendant corporation, the legislature enacted a law providing:
(i)that the majority of stockholders may amend the charter "without limitation,"
with a proviso for class voting on any amendments changing the rights, privileges, or
preferences of any class,--section 43; (2) that the liability of the corporation should not
be lessened by an amendment,--section 59. A general saving clause provided that the
act should not affect accrued rights or liabilities,-section 192. Mich. Pub. Acts 1931,
no. 327. A majority of preferred stockholders voted to postpone the redemption date
of the preferred stock. From a judgment denying him the right to redemption as of
the original date, the plaintiff, a dissenting stockholder, appealed. Held, reversed.
The right to redemption is a vested right; section 59 and the saving clause prohibited
an interference with the vested rights of stockholders. Sutton v. Globe Knitting Works,
267 N.W. 815 (Mich. 1936).
Under statutes authorizing amendments, changes in substantial rights of stockholders have been sanctioned by courts. See Berle and Means, Modem Corporations
and Private Property 2r2 (1934). Amendments creating an issue of stock to have
preference over the rights of a complaining stockholder have been sustained. Hinckley
v. Schwarzschild-SulzbergerCo., 107 App. Div. 470, 95 N.Y.S. 357 (1905); Salt Lake Automobile Co. v. Keith O'Brien Co., 45 Utah 218, 143 Pac. 1o15 (1914). Changes in par-

ticipation in dividends have been upheld. Davis v. Louisville Gas & Elec. Co., 16 Del.
Ch. 157, 142 Ad. 654 (1928); contra, Pronick v. SpiritsDistributingCo., 58 N.J. Eq. 97,
42 Atl. 586 (1899). A majority has been permitted to subject to further assessment
stock sold as fully paid and non-assessable. Somerville v. St. Louis fin. and Mill. Co.,
46 Mont. 268, 127 Pac. 464 (1912); cf. Garey v. St. Joe Mining Co., 32 Utah 497, 91
Pac. 369 (1907). Frequently, however, courts have by construction narrowed the
scope of statutes authorizing amendments when a literal construction would permit
modification of important rights of dissenting stockholders. See Garey v. St. Joe Mining Co., 32 Utah 497, 91 Pac. 369 (1907); Pronick v. Spirits DistributingCo., 58 N.J.
Eq. 97, 42 Ad. 586 (1899). Although courts do not so articulate, validity seems to depend on a balancing of the importance of the stockholder's right against the need for
corporate action. See Curran, Amendment of Corporate Charters, 32 Mich. L. Rev.
743, 748 (i934). Amendments depriving preferred stockholders of accrued but unpaid
dividends have been invalidated. Morris v. American Pub. Util. Co., 14 Del. Ch. 136,
122 At. 696 (1923). In a situation analogous to the instant case it has been held that
a statute permitting changes in "preferences and special rights," if constitutional,
would have authorized an amendment abolishing a sinking fund safeguarding redemption rights. Yoakum v. Providence Biltmore Hotel Co., 34 F. (2d) 533 (D.C.R.I. 1929).
On the analogy of the Yoakunt case, it is clear that section 43 of the Michigan statute
would authorize the amendment in the instant case. The court agrees that section 43
was broad enough when read alone, but urges that it must yield to the apparently inconsistent provisions in section 59 and in the saving clause. Inconsistency might have
properly been avoided if the court had interpreted the saving clause and section 59 as
applying only to the rights of strangers. But assuming that inconsistency was present,
the specific authorization of amendments affecting stockholder rights should have pre-
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vailed over the general language in section 59. Similarly, the purview should have prevailed over the saving clause. Black, Construction and Interpretation of Laws § 112
(1896).
Had the court in the instant case found that the statute authorized the amendment,
there would have remained the question of whether the statute was a constitutional
exercise of the reserve power. Statutory and constitutional provisions reserving the
power to amend corporation laws have been held to be written into the corporate
charter at the time of incorporation. i Thompson, Corporations § 429 (3d ed. 1927).
The charter constitutes a contract between the stockholders inter sese and between the
corporation and the state. Dow v. Northern R.R., 67 N.H. x, 36 At. 510 (1887);
7 Fletcher, Cyclopedia Corporations § 3657 (i93i). Legislation not within the scope
of the reserve power constitutes an unconstitutional impairment of contract. Ballantine, Corporations § 272 (1927). But the question of what legislation is authorized
under the reserve power has caused difficulty. Curran, Minority Stockholders and the
Amendment of Corporate Charters, 32 Mich. L. Rev. 743, 750 (1934). Although the
reservations are couched in general terms, courts have by construction restricted their
scope. Thus it has been held that under the reserve power the rights of the stockholders inter sese may not be affected. Matter of Election of Directors of Newark Library
Ass'n, 64 N.J.L. 217, 43 Atl. 435 (1899); Avondale Land Co. v. Shook, 170 Ala. 379, 54
So. 268 (1911). See Stern, The Limitations of the Power of a State under a Reserved
Right to Amend or Repeal Charters of Incorporation, 53 Am. L. Reg. (44 n.s.) 73, 85
(195o). The application of this standard would invalidate the statute in the instant
case. But the distinction between intra- and extra-corporate rights is hard to draw and
may unduly restrict future legislation. Thus most courts have not followed this rule.
Farbsteinv. Pacific Oil Tool Co., 127 Cal. App. 157, 15 P. (2d) 766 (1932); Lord v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 194 N.Y. 212, 87 N.E. 443 (1909); 7 Fletcher, Cyclopedia
Corporations §§ 3695-98 (193i). Confusion has been enriched by the question-begging
slogan that the reserve power cannot be constitutionally exercised to deprive a stockholder of vested rights. Clearly, whether or not a right is vested depends upon whether
the state has reserved the power to change it. One court, however, has made the surprising suggestion that, without regard to the language of the reservation clause,
statutes authorizing changes in what courts consider vested rights are unconstitutional.
Yoakum v. Providence Biltmore Hotel Co., 34 F. (2d) 533, 545 (D.C.R.I. 1929). There
is no apparent constitutional basis for invalidating statutes that admittedly come
within the scope of the reserve power, and this suggestion is illustrative of a desire to
strike down, without regard to the terms of the reservation, amendments which constitute an unreasonable deprivation of the rights of dissenting stockholders. Since the
reservation is a part of the corporate "contract," impairment of contract cannot be the
constitutional basis for invalidating amendments authorized by statutes admittedly
within the scope of the reserve power. But by an extension of notions of due process,
a court might strike down unnecessarily broad reservations as unconstitutional conditions. Although this would involve a radical limitation of the states' power over the
corporations they create, it would make possible a more effective protection of the
reasonable expectations of stockholders.
Corporations-Ultra Vires-Capacity of a Fraternal Beneficiary Society to Contract for Old Age Benefits-[llinois].-The plaintiff became a member of the de-

